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Abstract: This is a paper about “big data” and antitrust law.  For my purposes, big data refers to 
digital platforms that enable the discovery and sharing of information by consumers, and the 
harvesting and analysis of data on those consumers by the platform.  The obvious example of 
such a platform is Google.  The big platforms owe their market dominance not to anticompetitive 
conduct but to economies of scale.  I discuss three types of anticompetitive conduct associated 
with digital platforms: kill zone expropriation, acquisition of nascent rivals, and denial of access 
to data.  There is nothing so unusual about digital platforms that would require a reform of the 
antitrust laws.  Some are described as two-sided markets, but this designation, even after Ohio v. 
Amex, should not present an obstacle to the application of antitrust law.  
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This is a paper about big data and antitrust law.  The first question I should address is precisely 
what I have in mind by the term “big data.”  A search of the term on the internet reveals 
amorphous definitions, leaving one with the impression that big data is a conceptual category 
that includes several different things. 
For my purposes, big data refers to digital platforms that enable the discovery and sharing of 
information by consumers, and the harvesting and analysis of data on those consumers by the 
platform.  Because of the enormous quantities of data, the platforms must use algorithms and 
often machine learning to process the data.  Thus, big data includes, in this definition, a reference 
to the sophisticated processes by which the data are analyzed. 
The obvious example of such a digital platform is Google.  Consumers search for information on 
Google, and Google uses the information from consumer searches to improve its own search 
algorithms, and to provide information to advertisers on consumer preferences.  Google tracks 
the activities of consumers, as far as possible, to build out its database. 
In this paper, I focus on competition issues associated with digital platforms.1  However, 
competition is a broad concept itself.  There are many non-competition issues associated with 
digital platforms, such as privacy, which on further inspection are capable of being described as 
competition issues after all.2  I will therefore take a broad brush to the topic and sweep in non-
competition issues where relevant. 
The largest platforms owe their market dominance not to anticompetitive conduct but to 
economies of scale.  I discuss three types of anticompetitive conduct associated with digital 
platforms: kill zone expropriation, acquisition of nascent rivals, and denial of access to data.3  
There is nothing so unusual about the platforms that would require a reform of the antitrust laws.  
Some have been described as two-sided markets, but this designation, even after Ohio v. Amex,4 
should not present an obstacle to the application of antitrust law.  
Part I below discusses the economics of digital platforms and the processes that have generated 
scale.  Scale benefits platform consumers, but it also precipitates injuries to consumers, in the 
                                                 
1 For previous contributions to this topic, see D. Daniel Sokol & Roisin Comerford, Antitrust and Regulating Big 
Data, 23 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 1129 (2016); Wright, Joshua D. and Dorsey, Elyse, Antitrust Analysis of Big Data 
(December 31, 2016). 4(2) Competition Law & Policy Debate 35 (December 2016). Available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3165278, or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3165278; Stucke, Maurice E. and Grunes, 
Allen P., Debunking the Myths Over Big Data and Antitrust (May 31, 2015). CPI Antitrust Chronicle, May 2015; 
University of Tennessee Legal Studies Research Paper No. 276, available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2612562.  
2 Wright, supra note 1, at 38. 
3 The focus on specific anticompetitive theories is probably the feature that distinguishes this paper from previous 
contributions.  Sokol, supra note 1, offers a broad survey of the alleged anticompetitive harms and potential 
competition benefits of big data.  Similarly, Wright, supra note 1, offers a survey of anticompetitive theories and 
addresses whether antitrust law should be modified for big data competition claims.  Both Sokol and Wright see 
little need to modify existing antitrust law for big data cases.  For a view opposing those of Sokol and Wright, see 
Stucke and Grunes, supra note 1. 
4 Ohio v. American Express Co., 585 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018). 
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form of privacy invasions, online harassment, and intellectual property infringement.  Part II 
examines anticompetitive theories likely to be asserted against digital platforms.  Part III 
discusses the antitrust law applicable to these theories. 
 
I. Platforms 
 
The digital platforms with which most of us are familiar are Google and Facebook.  Google has a 
dominant market share in online search in every country except Russia and China.5  Facebook 
has roughly 2 billion users, almost half of the entire population of internet users.6  These large 
customer bases enable Google and Facebook to amass large quantities of data on billions of 
consumers.7  The data are used to improve services offered on the digital platforms.  Google, for 
example, uses its data on consumers to enable advertisers to target consumers who are most 
likely to purchase the advertised products.  Data also enable Google to continuously improve the 
quality of its search algorithms.8 
For digital platforms such as Google and Facebook, size results mostly from economies of scale.  
As the number of consumers increases, Google can amass more data, and use the data to improve 
its search experience and the accuracy of advertising matches.  In other words, as the platform 
expands and obtains more data, the cost of providing a given unit of service (e.g., the answer to a 
search query) falls.  Sophisticated data processing methods, such as machine learning and 
artificial intelligence, further enhance the scale economies effect. 
There are two processes giving rise to economies of scale in the digital platform markets.  One is 
fixed costs.  Much of the costs of providing Google’s services reside in the employment of 
engineers, and Google has consistently bid for the highest quality of this form of labor.  
Increasingly, digital platforms are also hiring content moderators to make sure that the material 
presented to consumers does not unduly tarnish their brands.  The costs of engineers are fixed, in 
the sense that the volume of the search service Google provides is not highly sensitive to the 
number of engineers the firm hires, after it reaches a sufficient scale to generate the service.  In 
                                                 
5 Google is permitted to operate in Russia, but is blocked in China.  For statistics on Google’s share of online search 
by country, see Share of desktop search traffic originating from Google in selected countries as of June 2018, 
STATISTA,  https://www.statista.com/statistics/220534/googles-share-of-search-market-in-selected-countries/.  
6 Facebook had 2.32 billion users as of fourth quarter of 2018, see Facebook: number of monthly active users 
worldwide 2008-2018, STATISTICA (Jan. 2019), https://www.statista.com/statistics/264810/number-of-monthly-
active-facebook-users-worldwide/.  Facebook users constitute roughly half of the total number of internet users, see 
Two Billion Internet Users are not on Facebook, OVERGROWN PATH (July 16, 2018), 
https://www.overgrownpath.com/2018/07/two-billion-internet-users-are-not-on.html.   
7 On google data collection, see Douglas Schmidt’s survey following a day in the life of an android user, exploring 
the ways in which Google collects user data through applications such as YouTube, Google Searches, Google maps, 
Chrome, and other Google-owned applications.  Douglas C. Schmidt, GOOGLE DATA COLLECTION, 2, VANDERBILT 
UNIVERSITY) (Aug. 15, 2018); On Facebook data collection, see Avantika Monnappa, How Facebook is Using Big 
Data-The Good, the Bad and the Ugly, SIMPLILEARN (Jul. 6, 2018), https://www.simplilearn.com/how-facebook-is-
using-big-data-article.  
8 How Search Algorithms Work, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/search/howsearchworks/algorithms/ 
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other words, once a given number of engineers produce the search machine, consumers can use 
the machine anywhere from zero to an uncountable number of times per day, and the cost to 
Google is largely the same.  The cost of content moderators is probably more dependent on the 
number of users of the service, but even here the elasticity of moderator cost to intensity of 
consumer use is well below one. 
The other source of economies of scale is data.  Data enable engineers to improve the quality of 
the search process at Google.  Thus, each consumer, by providing data, lowers the unit cost of 
servicing the next consumer.9  The intensity of this effect is magnified by the use of 
sophisticated data processing methods.  Google therefore has an interest in investing resources 
into the enhancement of data processing methods, such as machine learning and artificial 
intelligence.  The demand for such processes from the digital platforms, in turn, bids up the 
wages of researchers who specialize in data processing methods, bidding some of them out of 
their academic positions and into industry. 
Google also has an interest in investing resources into the creation and harvesting of more data 
on its consumers.  It is interesting to note that for many years after Google entered the market, 
observers wondered how the service would become a source of revenue – that is, how search 
could be monetized.10  That question has been answered; Google’s annual revenue in 2018 was 
$137 billion.11  Data have proven to be monetizable.  Because data are monetizable, Google 
gathers as much as data as it can on users through their own search inquiries, and through 
monitoring their activities online.  Using the acquired data, Google generates a detailed map of 
the preferences, personal characteristics, and location of every internet search consumer. 
In addition to the scale economies effect, the law provides a subsidy that has aided the expansion 
of digital platforms.  Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act,12 digital platforms 
such as Google are treated as information intermediaries rather than publishers.13  This relieves 
platforms of tort liability for harms caused by their activities.  Another safe harbor from liability 
is provided by Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, which protects Google 
from copyright liability if it takes down an infringing item after notification.14  In the absence of 
                                                 
9 Economies of scale in data include traditional network effects in addition to the improvements in service quality, 
on both sides of a platform, driven by data. See, James Currier, The Network Effects Manual: 13 Different Network 
Effects (and counting), MEDIUM (Jan. 9, 2018), https://medium.com/@nfx/the-network-effects-manual-13-different-
network-effects-and-counting-a3e07b23017d.  
10Rory Cellan-Jones and Mark Levene, The Most Valuble Company in the World, FORBES, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/guides/z9x6bk7.  
11 Alphabet Revenue 2006-2018, MACROTRENDS, 
https://www.macrotrends.net/stocks/charts/GOOG/alphabet/revenue.   
12 47 U.S.C. §230.  A platform such as Google could be penalized for failing to comply with a takedown order.  In 
this case, the path to a penalty would involve a platform user going to court and seeking a court order requiring the 
takedown, after which the platform may be punished by the court for failing to comply with the order.  Of course, to 
describe this process is also to note how unlikely it is that a platform actually will be forced to pay a significant 
penalty. 
13 Alina Selyukh, The New Clash Between Free speech and Privacy: Section 230: a Key Legal Shield for Facebook, 
Google is About to Change, NPR (March 21, 2018 5:11 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2018/03/21/591622450/section-230-a-key-legal-shield-for-
facebook-google-is-about-to-change.  
14 17 U.S.C. §512  
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these broad immunity shields, platforms such as Google would have to consider their potential 
liability based on defamation and related tort theories, or copyright law.  These costs would be 
directly related to scale and compel the platform to monitor its information services in order to 
minimize liability.  The cost of monitoring would constrain the platform’s incentive to expand.  
The platforms would have to be much more protective than they are now against harms created 
by platform speech.  They would also have to be more protective of the privacy of consumer data 
transferred to other entities. 
Although this is a paper about competition issues, the foregoing features of digital platforms 
have generated important problems currently viewed as unrelated to competition – though, that 
view may be incorrect.15  One is the matter of harms created by platform communication.  
Platform expression often results in injuries such as defamation, invasion of privacy, online 
harassment, and intellectual property infringement.  A platform such as Google might direct 
users to a link with defamatory statements about an individual, without suffering any risk of 
liability, or the platform may host material in violation of a copyright, again without suffering a 
risk of liability.  The result has been rampant intellectual property theft and the dissemination of 
harmful speech.16 
Consider, for example, YouTube, the video platform owned by Google.  Google hires platform 
moderators, and uses artificial intelligence, to monitor and take down videos that are extremely 
distasteful, or that involve obvious copyright violations.  In addition, an individual who thinks he 
has been defamed can file a form with Google to attempt to persuade it to take down the 
offending video.  Given Section 230 immunity, the key factor that motivates Google in screening 
content is a concern for its own brand, which may be tarnished by the hosting of offensive 
material on its search engine or on the YouTube platform.  This is a different set of incentives 
than those created by defamation or by copyright law.  It is not at all clear that a concern for 
brand tarnishment will lead a platform to exercise the same care in monitoring postings than 
would a concern over the risk of liability.  A concern for brand tarnishment might cause a digital 
platform to be too quick to take down some types of harmful expression and at the same time too 
slow to take down other types.  Platform expression that tends to aggravate or upset the median 
platform consumer, for example, would be quickly taken down as a result of current incentives to 
minimize brand tarnishment.  Platform expression that does not tend to aggravate the median 
user, while at the same time imposing concentrated harm on a single individual or firm – 
copyright violation would be an example – is unlikely to generate incentives for quick action on 
the part of the platform. 
                                                 
15 The view may be incorrect because competition would compel platforms to compete with respect to enhancing 
consumer privacy protections and minimizing the dissemination of harmful speech.  In the absence of both 
competition and liability, platforms have relatively weak (or distorted) incentives to protect consumers. 
16 For an impassioned presentation of claims of Google’s facilitation and participation in intellectual property theft 
see, Scott Cleland, The Evidence Google’s Systematic Theft is Anti-Competitive, FORBES ((Jan. 20, 2012), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/scottcleland/2012/01/20/the-evidence-googles-systematic-theft-is-anti-competitive/.  
On the dissemination of harmful speech on platforms such as Google see, Lisa Eadicicco, Facebook and Google Are 
Going To War Against Hate Speech, TIME, May 31, 2016, http://time.com/4352179/facebook-twitter-google-hate-
speech/; Caitlin Elizabeth Ring, Hate Speech in Social Media: An Exploration of the Problem and Its Proposed 
Solutions, in JOURNALISM & MASS COMMUNICATION GRADUATE THESES & DISSERTATIONS 5-14 (2013).  
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To get a sharper sense of how brand tarnishment incentives work, consider the demographics of 
Google users.  Search consumers between the ages of 18 and 44 are most likely to use Google, 
while older consumers are more likely to use Bing.17  As far as employees, the average at Google 
is 29 years old.18  Google is sensitive to the preferences of employees as well as those of users.19  
These demographic differences should generate different incentives with respect to brand 
tarnishment.  Given the demographic data, Google’s moderators are likely to be especially 
sensitive to the preferences of consumers below the age of 40.  Yet another stress factor loading 
on top of the age distribution of users is the tendency of millennial consumers to demand that the 
brands with which they associate also agree with their political preferences.20 
Even with all of these issues, one point that should not go unnoticed is that the most popular 
digital platforms, Google and Facebook, have demonstrated the usefulness of data in advertising.  
The advertising industry, before the rise of digital platforms, was dominated by firms that 
claimed to have a special expertise in discerning what pitches should be made to consumers.  
The new digital platforms are displacing this ancient system based on subjective expertise with 
one based on data measuring consumer preferences.  The consequence has been that advertising 
based platforms that do not directly measure consumer preferences, such as newspapers, have 
seen their advertising dollars migrate to Google and Facebook. 
 
II. Competition Issues 
 
Digital platforms have generated competition complaints in recent years.  In this part, I consider 
three anticompetitive theories related to digital platforms: kill zone expropriation, acquisition of 
nascent rivals, and denial of access to data. 
 
A. Kill Zone Expropriation 
                                                 
17 See Rebecca Sentence, What are the differences in how age demographics search the internet?, USER ZOOM (Dec. 
11, 2018), https://www.userzoom.com/blog/what-are-the-differences-in-how-age-demographics-search-the-internet/  
([U]sers aged anywhere between 18 and 44 were most likely to be using Google to search the web. Users aged 
between 45 and 64 were most likely to be found using Bing (with usage being most common among the 55-64 age 
group), while for users aged 65+, Yahoo! was the most popular search engine.) 
18 Max Nisen, A 64-Year-Old Engineer is Suing Google for Age Discrimination, QUARTZ (April 24, 2015), 
https://qz.com/390835/google-age-discrimination/.  
19In 2018, a group of Google Engineers refused to work on technology that would help Google secure a military 
contract because they opposed, on moral grounds, Google’s contribution to the technology.  See, Mark Bergen, 
Google Engineers Refused to Build Security Tool to Win Military Contracts, BLOOMBERG (June 21, 2018), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-21/google-engineers-refused-to-build-security-tool-to-win-
military-contracts.    
20 A 2015 Study by Nielson found 81 percent of millennials expect their favorite companies to make public 
declarations of good corporate citizenship. Sarah Landrum, Millennials Driving Brands to Practice Socially 
Responsible Marketing, FORBES (Ma. 17, 2017), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/sarahlandrum/2017/03/17/millennials-driving-brands-to-practice-socially-responsible-
marketing/#723ddfa94990.  
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One class of anticompetitive theories alleged against digital platforms falls under the label “kill 
zone” expropriation.21  A digital platform provides an ecosystem for new businesses in the form 
of platform applications.  However, the platform owner often has it within its power to destroy 
applications on its platform.  Thus, any application on the platform is within the kill zone of the 
platform owner.22 
The classic example of the kill zone problem, as well as current operative antitrust law, is 
provided by United States v. Microsoft (Microsoft III).23  The platform in this case was the 
desktop of the Microsoft operating system.  Independent software vendors created software 
applications that could operate on the Microsoft system.  Over the years, the Microsoft operating 
system had improved in quality by integrating into the operating system numerous software 
functions that previously had been sold by independent software vendors as applications that 
could be purchased and installed on the operating system. 
Microsoft III dealt with Microsoft’s conduct toward Netscape Navigator, an independent web 
browser that had become a popular application on the Microsoft operating system.  In response 
to Navigator’s popularity, Microsoft integrated its own browser, Internet Explorer, into the 
operating system.  This meant that anyone who purchased the Microsoft operating system did not 
have to purchase a separate browser.  Netscape complained that Microsoft’s integration of 
Internet Explorer as a component of its operating system effectively killed Navigator. 
Here is a version of the kill zone phenomenon involving Google.   An innovator creates a new 
vertical search service (a search “subplatform,” such as Yelp, generating search results under a 
broad topic or media type) on Google, say comparing restaurants in a given locality.  Google, in 
response, creates a competing vertical search platform replicating that of the innovator.  The 
original vertical search platform loses traffic and therefore advertising revenue as users focus on 
Google’s service.  Google has an inherent advantage in attracting users to its own vertical search 
subplatforms.  After all, Google has an enormous trove of data on user search activity, and can 
determine which features of a vertical search function are particularly attractive to users.  Google 
can determine the ranking of its own vertical search application.  In the competition between the 
vertical search platform innovator and Google, Google is certain to win.  Any innovation that 
occurs within the Google search domain is inherently within Google’s kill zone. 
Here is a version of the kill zone game involving Apple.  A software innovator creates a new app 
for the Apple App Store.  Apple notices that the new app sells at a brisk pace and decides to offer 
its own version of the app as part of the iPhone operating system.  Again, Apple is in a position 
                                                 
21 On kill zones in the technology sectors, see Into the danger zone: American tech giants are making life tough for 
startups, ECONOMIST (June 2, 2018), https://www.economist.com/business/2018/06/02/american-tech-giants-are-
making-life-tough-for-startups.   
22 Of course, even applications not on the platform can fall within the kill zone of a digital platform. However, such 
replication is a standard competitive strategy. 
23 United States v. Microsoft Corporation, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
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to observe the features the innovator’s app that are particularly attractive to consumers, and to 
replicate and improve upon those features. 
An important characteristic of the kill zone phenomenon is that the platform owner has the 
luxury of sitting back and watching innovation occur on its platform.  When it spots an 
especially productive innovation, the platform owner can leap and swallow it whole. This means 
that any innovator on the platform knows that there is an upper limit to its profit from innovation, 
which triggers expropriation by the platform owner. 
Replication is not the only route through which the platform owner can expropriate the platform 
innovator.  An alternative strategy, to the same effect, is for the platform owner to approach the 
innovator with an acquisition offer.  In this scenario, the innovator at least has the prospect of 
receiving a payoff for suffering expropriation.  The payoff, however, may be unremunerative.  
The platform owner has the option to replicate the innovator’s application cheaply, or to make an 
acquisition offer to the innovator.  Given that the cost of replication is low, the owner would not 
have an incentive to offer a buyout that is significantly greater than the cost of replication. 
One’s first reaction to this tale is probably to think that the kill zone game is harmful to platform 
innovation.  This is not obvious.  When the platform owner replicates a particular innovative 
function and integrates the function into the platform, it enhances the entire platform, which is 
itself a form of innovation with benefits to consumers.  The benefits to consumers are necessarily 
greater with replication and integration of a productive functionality across the entire platform 
than with the functionality residing exclusively within a stand-alone application residing on the 
platform.  Integration within the platform motivates or enables other applications to exploit the 
new functionality, which enhances the utility provided by other applications residing on the 
platform. 
It is not within the long-term interests of the platform to expropriate application innovators 
before they are able to make a return that fully compensates for the costs of innovation.  A 
forward-looking platform owner would give the application innovator some time to earn profits 
from the innovation before swooping in and killing off the application.  Of course, platform 
owners may not always act within their long-term interests.  The short-run profits from 
expropriation may exceed the perceived long-run costs of discouraging innovators on the 
platform.  If there is competition among platforms, the platform owners who expropriate their 
innovators too quickly will lose relative to those who wait longer.  But where there is no such 
competition, the only factor standing as an obstacle to premature expropriation, and the 
consequent discouragement of innovation on the platform, is the ability of the platform owner to 
correctly evaluate its long-term interests. 
Another factor that should be considered is that application innovators are aware of the platform 
owner’s incentives in the kill zone game.  Knowing of the risk of expropriation, platform 
innovators can adopt strategies that enable profitable entry in spite of the risk of future 
expropriation.  One strategy is to enter with a suite of platform applications.  The application 
most likely to be expropriated by the platform owner can serve as a gateway to other applications 
within the suite.  When expropriation occurs, the innovator would lose the profits from the 
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expropriated application while gaining in profit from the related applications.  As the date of 
expropriation approaches, the innovator would hike the price on the targeted application to 
squeeze as much money out of it as possible before the expropriation date. 
Many observers have noted that venture capital firms will not fund firms within the kill zone of a 
platform owner.24  This is important evidence of the negative innovation effect of kill zone 
expropriation.  However, such observations are largely anecdotal.  Apple’s App Store contains 
roughly 2 million apps at present.  Between 2008 and 2018, the number of apps in Apple’s store 
increased from 500 to 2 million.25  This huge rate of growth, 4,000 percent over ten years, is hard 
to square with the assertion that entry is difficult to encourage within a kill zone.  Of course, 
entry could have been greater; perhaps Apple’s App Store would have a billion apps in the 
absence of the threat of kill zone expropriation.  Nevertheless, the sheer size of the app store 
suggests that quite a large number of entrants are not deterred by the threat of expropriation. 
The kill zone game can be analogized to patent infringement, where the infringement kills off a 
patent and makes the market in the particular innovation competitive.  Here, the “infringer” is the 
platform owner and the “patentee” is the application innovator.  The analogy is still imperfect, 
though, because in the kill zone game, expropriation has a positive externality across other 
applications on the platform.  The kill zone game involves infringement with strong spillover 
benefits to related markets. 
From a social welfare perspective, infringement is not always a negative.  Patents have limited 
terms, because at some point the dynamic gain from innovation is outweighed by the static cost 
of protection.26  The same social incentives exist within the platform setting.  Hence, the mere 
fact that the platform owner eventually expropriates the platform innovator is not by itself proof 
of inefficiency.  Obviously, the private incentives of the platform owner may diverge from the 
social incentives for expropriation.  This is not apparent, though, because the platform owner, 
unlike the infringer in the typical case, suffers a cost from being too quick to expropriate.  
Gaining a reputation for swift expropriation deters innovation on the platform, reducing the 
platform’s long-term value. 
The kill zone problem, as I have described it so far, is not primarily an antitrust issue.  Indeed, 
expropriation by the platform owner unambiguously enhances short-run consumer welfare.  The 
sense in which expropriation might be viewed as anticompetitive is that it may discourage 
innovation on the platform, and such discouragement may reduce consumer welfare in the long 
run.  Traditional antitrust, however, has been reluctant to condemn a transaction that obviously 
and substantially increases short-term consumer welfare. 
One plausible scenario in which kill zone expropriation becomes an antitrust issue is where the 
expropriated firm has the potential to become a rival to the platform itself.  This was the theory 
underlying Microsoft III.  The Justice Department argued, successfully, that the Netscape 
                                                 
24 Supra note 21. 
25 See App Store (iOS), WIKIPEDIA (Jan. 27, 2019, 6:58),  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/App_Store_(iOS).  
26RONALD A. CASS AND KEITH N. HYLTON, LAWS OF CREATION: PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WORLD OF IDEAS, 52-57 
(Harvard University Press 2013). 
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Navigator browser was a species of software called “middleware.”  Middleware, according to the 
Justice Department, sat functionally between the operating system and applications.  In theory, 
independent software developers could write applications that are integrated with, or capable of 
being loaded onto, the browser.  As more software developers targeted the browser as a 
launching ground, according to Justice’s theory, the operating system would become 
unimportant, and a competitive market in operating systems would arise.  Thus, expropriating 
Netscape Navigator through replication and integration, as Microsoft did, prevented a rival 
platform from arising. 
This antitrust theory raises significant questions of proof.  How, for example, could one 
determine if the alleged middleware product would become, within a reasonable period, a rival to 
the operating system?  Almost two decades have passed since Microsoft III and still no 
middleware product has arisen as an alternative to the major desktop operating systems.27  This 
experience belies the government’s theory in Microsoft III.  While, the theory that kill zone 
expropriation can violate Section 2 of the Sherman Act is plausible, courts should demand 
considerable evidence in support of the theory to avoid imposing antitrust liability on platforms 
on the basis of purely conjectural harms to consumers. 
A second plausible sense in which kill zone expropriation becomes a potential antitrust issue 
arises when the platform owner replicates not only the functionality of the innovator but also the 
informational details to such a level that the application cannot differentiate itself from the 
platform owner’s clone.  Suppose, for example, the platform owner infringes copyrighted 
material residing in the application or strips out (non-copyrightable) information contributed by 
users of the application.28  Such a complete replication would expropriate much of the 
experience-based value of the application.  Although no court in the U.S. has entertained an 
antitrust claim based on such a theory, this hypothetical describes a species of competitive 
predation, and should be actionable under the antitrust laws. 
 
B. Acquisition of nascent rivals 
 
Another competition issue involves the acquisition of nascent rivals.  In this case, the platform 
owner acquires a firm – a fledgling platform – that could grow into a rival.  The common 
example is Facebook’s acquisition of Instagram in 2012. 
                                                 
27 James Grimmelman helpfully noted, in an email, that the middleware platform market has indeed expanded 
rapidly since the Microsoft III decision, with the most prominent example being Google’s Chrome OS.  However, 
the desktop PC market remains dominated by Microsoft (Windows) and Apple (macOS).  Google’s Android 
dominates the market in smartphone operating systems. The stasis in the desktop market has resulted probably 
because the incremental efficiencies provided by browser-based systems such as Chrome OS have not been 
sufficient to compel desktop users to migrate in large numbers to such middleware platforms. 
28 The scope of copyright liability might be uncertain, and therefore present a disincentive to replicating an 
application.  Oracle America, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, (2014). If the platform owner is uncertain about 
liability from replication, it may choose to make an acquisition bid rather than replicate.  Still, the acquisition bid 
will be biased downward by the ease of replication and the low probability of copyright liability. 
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The difficult question is determining whether the acquisition of a fledging platform by a larger 
platform constitutes acquisition of a nascent rival.  The fledging platform may cater to a different 
set of consumers.  One platform may cater to consumers over the age of 30 while the other 
platform caters to consumers under the age of 30.  This poses the same risk to competition as the 
acquisition by one engine maker of another engine maker who sells in a different (non-
substitutable) market29 – for example, a manufacturer of car engines acquires a manufacturer of 
airplane engines.  As time passes, and consumers gain access to air taxis and other such modes of 
travel, the car engine may become obsolete and replaced, for most consumers, by the airplane 
engine.  To the extent that experience in manufacturing car engines can be transferred to 
manufacturing airplane engines, the acquisition may have efficiency features, with little 
anticompetitive harm.  Similarly, the joining of two digital platforms that are not competing 
would appear to offer efficiency gains, in the form of consolidation of fixed costs and 
aggregation of data, with little potential for competitive harm. 
This description may be applicable to Facebook’s acquisition of Instagram.  Though many 
commentators suggest that antitrust authorities would block the acquisition if it were brought for 
approval today,30 it is not clear that the acquisition was anticompetitive.  Facebook, which 
initially catered to the young, is on the path to becoming the social network for seniors.31  
Instagram caters to a younger group.  Given that a social network consisting of people over the 
age of 40 may include the parents of most teenagers, the teenagers may prefer to communicate 
on a social network that caters to younger people.  When the teens become parents themselves, 
their children may prefer to communicate within a new social network for their own generation. 
The group that suffers the greatest risk of harm by the merger of two social networks is 
advertisers.  However, advertisers might benefit from the richer information and the efficiencies 
generated by the aggregation of networks.  Facebook’s investments into data processing (for 
example, artificial intelligence) constitute a large fixed cost that would have to be replicated 
across independent social networks to match each other in efficiency.  The merger enhances the 
value of investment in such data processing, which has external effects in generating a greater 
supply of data processing engineers. 
                                                 
29 See U.S. v. Winslow, 227 U.S. 202, 218 (1913) (“It is as lawful for one corporation to make every part of a steam 
engine, and to put the machine together, as it would be for one to make the boilers and another to make the wheels. 
Until the one intent is nearer accomplishment than it is by such a juxtaposition alone, no intent could raise the 
conduct to the dignity of an attempt.”). 
30 Tim Wu, The case for breaking up Facebook and Instagram, WASHINGTON POST (September 28, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2018/09/28/case-breaking-up-facebook-
instagram/?utm_term=.32da07378665; see also Sally Hubbard, The Case for why Big Tech is Violating Antitrust 
Laws, CNN (Jan. 2, 2019 10:34 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/02/perspectives/big-tech-facebook-google-
amazon-microsoft-antitrust/index.html.   
Robert Reich, Break up Facebook (and while we're at it, Google, Apple and Amazon), THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 20, 
2018), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/nov/20/facebook-google-antitrust-laws-gilded-age.   
31 Panos Mourdoukoutas, A Bearish Sign For Facebook – Aging, FORBES (May 1, 2018), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/panosmourdoukoutas/2018/05/01/a-bearish-sign-for-facebook-aging/#3cbb44772a0d; 
Mark Sweney, Is Facebook for Old People? Over-55s Flock in as the Young Leave, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 12, 2018), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/feb/12/is-facebook-for-old-people-over-55s-flock-in-as-the-young-
leave.   
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To the extent consumers are harmed, it is by the absence of social networks that pursue different 
policies with respect to privacy and harmful expression.  Mergers among social networks 
sacrifice the social benefits of diversity in product offerings.  The social gain from the merger is 
in supply-side efficiency.  It is unclear whether the welfare loss from reduced differentiation is 
greater than the gain in efficiency.  Ordinarily, such a question is best left to the market.  
Competition agencies are not well suited to determine whether the social welfare from greater 
product differentiation is greater than the social welfare from increased efficiency. 
A more competitive environment is observed in online search platforms, where Google and Bing 
dominate the market in the U.S.  The efficiency gains from exploiting search data have not been 
so asymmetrical as to leave Google the only search platform in the U.S. market.  Bing, with a 
smaller share of the market, has been able to exploit data efficiencies sufficiently to remain 
competitive with Google.  Some differentiation has appeared as a result.  Bing appears to attract 
a different set of search consumers.  Moreover, competition between Bing and Google has 
generated some degree of property in data.  Bing compensates users for search, through its 
rewards system.  Such compensation effectively recognizes consumer entitlements to data 
generated by their online activity.  Competitive bidding for data would, over time, generate a 
system of property in data.  
 
C. Denial of Access to Data 
 
Another set of potential antitrust theories would point to the control of data as a source of 
unlawful advantage in digital platform markets.  Competitors, it follows, should be given access 
to the data of large digital platforms. 
Such claims would fall under the “essential facility” theory of antitrust.  Under the theory, it may 
be a violation of antitrust law to deny access to some facility necessary for competition in a 
market. 
The essential facility theory has been rejected, for the most part, by the Supreme Court.  Under 
Trinko,32 antitrust claims based on a supposed duty, of a dominant firm or a group of firms, to 
share a facility are governed by a specific intent test.  To prove an antitrust violation, the plaintiff 
has to show that there is no legitimate or procompetitive rationale that might explain the denial 
of access.  The evidence must convincingly support an inference that the dominant firm sought to 
destroy its rival. 
Essential facility theories are unlikely to fare any better in the courts when they involve digital 
platforms than when they involve physical infrastructure such as access to telecommunications 
                                                 
32 Verizon Communications v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004). 
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networks.  In either case, the incentives generated by a duty-to-share rule are complicated and 
potentially undesirable.33 
Useful data do not fall out of the sky into the laps of digital platforms.  Google must create its 
data using the search inquiries of consumers.  Social welfare probably cannot be enhanced by 
expropriating data from Google, even if the government or a third party could develop the skills 
to construct a database and to exploit it.  If the government were to expropriate data from Google 
for the benefit of other firms, it would injure Google’s incentives to harvest and process the data.  
If the government were to attempt to replicate Google by harvesting raw search inquiries, it 
would raise more serious privacy issues than exist now, and also generate the problem of how 
the government, within a reasonable budget, could possibly replicate Google’s data processing 
capabilities. 
Some have suggested that data should be treated as the labor of the digital platform user.34  I find 
this theory dubious.  First, labor typically consists of activity engaged in for the purpose of 
generating a useful product or service sought by some entity or individual.  This definition does 
not fit much of the activity of online consumers, such as watching videos for entertainment on 
YouTube.  To call such activity labor merely because it produces data that are useful to Google 
is equivalent to calling the act of driving on a toll road labor because it produces revenue for the 
operators of the toll road.  Moreover, the online consumer does not give the data in an 
immediately useful form to the platform; the platform must create data from the user’s activity 
on the platform.  Most of the labor, as the term traditionally is understood, occurs on the side of 
the platform, not on the consumer’s side.  Second, much of the activity of consumers on digital 
platforms should be described as leisure rather than labor.  Consider, for example, the numerous 
consumers of YouTube who enjoy watching videos of cats.  Should the activity of watching cat 
videos be defined as labor, merely because it generates data for Google?  If so, many other 
activities that we associate with leisure may be recharacterized as labor. 
Of course, there are many things we do today that we call labor that might have been viewed as 
leisure in the past.  My activity of writing this piece for this symposium perhaps would have 
been viewed as a form of leisure two hundred years ago, when most labor involved physically 
demanding activity.  If not leisure, perhaps my writing activity would have been considered a 
type of sport, engaged in by members of the social elite.  In a Veblenesque society, such activity 
would be consistent with that of a member of the class that engages mostly in adventure and 
control over government, while a lower class actually worked to produce items and services to 
meet the immediate consumption needs of the population.35 
The line between labor and leisure perhaps cannot be drawn easily today by looking at the 
physical or mental demands of the activity alone.  However, one feature of leisure, in 
contradistinction to labor, is that an individual can quit a leisure activity at any time without 
                                                 
33 See, e.g. KEITH HYLTON, ANTITRUST LAW: ECONOMIC THEORY AND COMMON LAW EVOLUTION  207-11 
(Cambridge University Press 2003). 
34 ERIC A. POSNER & GLEN WEYL, RADICAL MARKETS UPROOTING CAPITALISM AND DEMOCRACY FOR A JUST 
SOCIETY, 208-213 (Princeton University Press 2018). 
35 THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS (1899). 
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suffering a harm.  Someone who watches cat videos can stop and there is no personal loss 
suffered as a result – other than the loss of the idiosyncratic utility generated by watching cat 
videos.  Someone who stops a labor activity faces the harm that follows failing to produce 
something with an appropriable market value or that would be of interest for purchase by 
someone else.  Much of the activity of consumers on digital platforms fails to meet this test.  
 
III. Antitrust Law 
 
Antitrust law has only begun to deal with the issues discussed above.  As I noted earlier, 
Microsoft III provides the template for plaintiffs for any kill zone expropriation claim.  The 
difficult part is determining whether a venture “killed off” by a dominant platform’s 
expropriation had the potential to become a rival to the platform. 
Consider, for example, Google’s expropriation of vertical search services.  The European 
Commission found an antitrust violation, but the FTC refused to file an antitrust complaint, 
based on Section 5 of the FTC Act, against Google for the same conduct.   
For an expropriated vertical search subplatform to bring a successful Section 2 claim against 
Google under Microsoft III, the plaintiff would have to persuade a court that Google’s 
expropriation enabled Google to maintain monopoly power in the general “universal” search 
market.  One obstacle such a plaintiff would find is that Google’s market share in universal 
search now stands at roughly 63 percent.36  This is below the numerical threshold of 64 percent 
that Judge Hand deemed doubtful, in Alcoa,37 as a sign of monopoly status.  Market share 
statistics are by no means determinative of monopoly power, which is generally a function of 
market share, supply-side substitution possibilities, and demand-side substitution possibilities.38  
Still, Google’s 63 percent market share is well below the market share percentages observed in 
the major monopolization cases, such as Alcoa and Microsoft III.  Moreover, as Google has often 
repeated, competition, primarily in the form of Bing, is only one click away.  The ease of 
demand side substitution is notable. 
The second difficulty facing an expropriated vertical search service that attempts to sue Google 
on the theory of Microsoft III is that it is highly unlikely that any vertical search subplatform 
could ever become a rival to Google in universal search.  The monopolization theory in 
Microsoft III was accepted as plausible by the trial court because the Justice Department offered 
a reasonably persuasive theory that Netscape Navigator was one of several middleware products 
that could eventually displace the Microsoft operating system.  Again, experience has not 
provided support to Justice’s theory.  At the time of the lawsuit, however, the theory seemed 
                                                 
36 Market Share of Search Engines in the United States 2008-2018, STATISTICA (December 2018), 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/267161/market-share-of-search-engines-in-the-united-states/  
37 United States v. Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 
38 See, e.g., HYLTON, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 33, at 230-43. 
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plausible.  In the universal search market, in contrast, there is no reason to believe that a vertical 
search subplatform will replace Google in the foreseeable future. 
Instead of relying on Microsoft III, the expropriated vertical service could sue Google on the 
theory that it has monopolized the vertical search market through replication.  But this is 
obviously an implausible antitrust theory.  No court would hold that a dominant firm violates the 
Sherman Act merely by offering a competing product.  However, as suggested earlier, a 
complete expropriation of not only the functionality of the vertical service but also the 
accumulated information residing in the service (for example, consumer reviews) would appear 
to be a type of predation.  In this event, it should be a sufficient remedy for the platform owner to 
stop replicating the information on the application and purge the stolen information from the 
clone.  The advantages of the platform owner over the innovator would remain substantial 
without the stripped-out information. 
The expropriation of vertical search services is admittedly a vexing problem under the law.  It 
seems unfair that Google watches the development of vertical search subplatforms, and when a 
particularly valuable one appears, Google replicates, and thereby kills or badly injures, the 
subplatform.  However, as I noted earlier in the case of Apple and its App Store, it is not within 
Google’s self-interest to replicate every valuable subplatform before the subplatform innovator 
can recoup its development costs.  Such an aggressive posture would discourage the 
development of vertical search subplatforms, to Google’s long-term detriment.  Indeed, if 
subplatform developers began generally to perceive Google’s platform as a hostile environment 
because of the risk of expropriation, they would flock to Bing’s search platform.  As more 
subplatform developers migrated along this path, Bing eventually would gain a reputation as a 
superior search engine to Google. 
Ohio v. Amex has gained attention because of its implications for digital platforms,39 though it is 
mostly an old economy case.  Credit card networks existed long before digital platforms.  The 
case involved an antitrust challenge to Amex’s anti-steering provisions, which sought 
contractually to prevent a merchant from persuading a purchaser to use some other method of 
payment than the Amex card. 
Amex treats the credit card market as a two-sided market involving consumers, on one side, and 
merchants on the other.  This is a feature of many digital platforms.  Google has search 
consumers on one side and advertisers on the other.  Bing’s rewards program is an example of a 
negative price charged to consumers on one side of the platform while charging a positive price 
                                                 
39 See, e.g., Mark MacCarthy, What ‘Ohio v. AMEX’ really means for tech, CIO: TECH POLICY PERSPECTIVES (Mar. 
26, 2018), https://www.cio.com/article/3265454/what-ohio-v-amex-really-means-for-tech.html; Joyce Jung Min 
Yeo, Ohio v. American Express: Should Tech Giants Thank AMEX?, ?, 2018 Colum. Bus. L. Rev (Oct. 7, 2018), https://cblr.columbia.edu/ohio-v-american-express-should-tech-giants-thank-amex/.  
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to advertisers on the other.  Google does not offer rewards for searching, so it charges a zero 
price to consumers.40 
Some would argue that Google consumers “pay” by permitting Google to track their activity and 
harvest data from it.  However, from the consumer’s perspective, Google saves them time and 
money.  Rather than spend hours in the library researching a topic, the consumer can find the 
answer quickly through Google.  In the course of doing so, the consumer gives data to Google.  
The same phenomenon will arise when most automobiles track driver activity and return the 
resulting data to the manufacturer.  When that day arrives, one will be able to argue that drivers 
“pay” for the activity of driving by giving data to car manufacturers.  But why would a driver 
“pay” to use his own car?  Because it is so much faster than walking. 
The foregoing analogy between driving a car and using Google illustrates my concerns over the 
questionable uses of the terms “labor” and “paying with time” to describe consumer activity on 
digital platforms.  The platform consumer is not paying in the normal sense of the term.  He 
voluntarily puts himself in an environment where the platform can gain from harvesting data 
from his activity.  In a competitive environment, that gain to the platform will translate into 
lower prices, or perhaps negative prices, to the consumer.  Competition is the reason we observe 
Bing offering rewards to lure search consumers from Google. 
Amex holds that both sides of a two-sided market must be taken into account in an assessment of 
the relevant market and market power.  Evidence that merchants are being charged high prices is 
insufficient to generate an inference of market power, or abuse, without some analysis of the 
benefits accruing to consumers on the other side of the credit card network.  In a two-sided 
market, such as the Amex credit card network, the provider may find that its optimal strategy is 
to charge a negative price on one side and a positive price on the other of the platform.  The 
observation of a positive or monopolist-seeming price on one side of the market is not 
necessarily a sign of monopoly power.  Indeed, in the credit card network, every transaction 
involves both a theoretical price charged by the platform to the consumer and a price charged by 
the platform charged to the merchant.  The actual price charged by the platform for every 
transaction is the sum of the two prices.  Since the consumer’s price is negative, the sum of the 
two prices is less than the price charged to the merchant. 
Although Amex is about market power, it is also about the scope and usefulness of efficiency 
defenses.  Consider the efficiency case for Amex’s restrictions.  
If merchants regularly assert to consumers that they accept the Amex card, and then persuade 
consumers who shop in their stores to use a different card for purchase, then they gain the benefit 
of attracting Amex cardholders while avoiding the fee of servicing their card.  The merchant fee, 
however, is what funds the rewards Amex gives to cardholders, and thereby retains their loyalty 
to the Amex card.  Thus, when Amex seeks to restrict merchants from steering consumers away 
from the Amex card, it is seeking to block a type of competition among cards at the till, in order 
                                                 
40 Of course, the zero price on Google could be interpreted as a negative price because it fails to cover some 
imputation of incremental cost to the consumer.  But this interpretation would greatly complicate any attempt to use 
prices as a method of inferring monopoly power. 
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to promote competition among cards.  Amex cannot fund its promotional efforts in the market 
for cards if merchants pretend to accept the card without really accepting it. 
At first blush, Amex seems to be a case about honest dealing.  As a preliminary matter, it seems 
doubtful that firm A should be prevented by the law from entering into contracts with merchants 
in which it asks those merchants not to both pretend that customers can use a certain service of 
firm A at their store, and at the same time  dissuade customers from doing so.  One should have a 
strong argument not to permit such a contract.  After all, the merchant is entirely free to reject the 
contract and go without the services of firm A.   But antitrust often rejects freedom of contract 
principles, and so it is worthwhile to consider the economic argument in more depth. 
If the Amex card network were no different from any other card network other than the rewards, 
then it would be difficult to see a strong efficiency case.  This would be no different from a large 
purchaser demanding a rebate.  If a large purchaser demands a rebate, then the result is 
procompetitive in a sense, but the efficiency case is ambiguous.  The large purchaser’s rebate 
might force prices higher for other consumers. 
The analogy between the Amex network and a large purchaser demanding a rebate illustrates an 
interesting feature of the vocal Amex critique.  Critics of Amex have in essence taken the position 
that a large purchaser should not be permitted to demand a discount from a seller.  This position 
may or may not be consistent with enhancing consumer welfare.  It is, however, advocating a 
restriction on a facet of competition.  Moreover, to remain consistent with the anti-Amex 
position, one should also support efforts on the part of retailers to resist demands for rebates or 
discounts by large purchasers.  A most favored nation contract, for example, would facilitate the 
resistance by sellers of demands for discounts from buyers.  Also consistent with the position 
would be support to retailers when they combine to resist demands for discounts, say by forming 
an agreement to refuse to discount.  Note that these arguments run ineluctably into the position 
of supporting collusive conduct. 
However, Amex is not clearly the same scenario as that of a large purchaser demanding a rebate.  
Amex cardholders constitute a desirable portion of the market of retail consumers, both because 
they are wealthier than the average and are more likely to make a purchase.  If a merchant 
advertises that he accepts the Amex card, then he attracts those consumers to his store.  Since the 
consumers tend to be wealthier with a higher propensity to spend, the merchant is more likely to 
offer a range of products and services catering to this type of consumer.  Merchants who accept 
the Amex card also gain access to informational services provided by Amex to its merchant 
customers.41  Thus, the Amex card serves as a coordinating device, attracting consumers with a 
propensity to spend and signaling to those consumers that the merchant offers products and 
services of their liking.  Providing notice that the card is accepted suggests to those consumers 
that the merchant will offer a higher level of service (attributable in part to the informational 
services of Amex) to the consumer than does the average retailer.  Just as retail price 
                                                 
41 On merchant analytics services, see Mary Hurn, AmEx Debuts Consulting and Analytics Arm for Business 
Customers, DATA STRATEGY TECHNOLOGY (Nov. 19, 2009), https://www.dmnews.com/data/news/13062182/amex-
debuts-consulting-and-analytics-arm-for-business-customers.  Amex also provided fraud protection services to 
merchants. 
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maintenance may be a method of ensuring brand promotion, customer service, and loyalty on the 
part of the retailer, the Amex card may serve to support a similar commitment between the 
retailer and the Amex consumer. 
To the extent merchants compete to attract the Amex consumer, they will attempt to take on the 
features of outlets that cater to such consumers, and this competition generates positive 
externalities for consumers who do not carry the Amex card but who also shop in the same 
stores.  For example, Amex claims to offer superior fraud protection services, which benefit both 
consumer and merchant.  To the extent those services deter fraud and identity theft, or enable 
merchants to better detect credit-card fraud generally, there is a benefit to non-card consumers. 
Merchants who accept the Amex card will tend to be different from the merchants who do not 
accept it.  Generally, small businesses and those catering to consumers of average wealth and 
propensity to spend do not accept the Amex card.42 
The efficiencies associated with Amex’s conduct are recognized in the Sylvania doctrine,43 
which prescribes rule of reason analysis where intrabrand competition is restricted to enhance 
interbrand competition.  However, Sylvania, if read in a narrow sense, applies only to vertical, 
supply-chain relationships.  The Supreme Court has never clarified the degree to which Sylvania 
applies in the horizontal setting, though it has given hints.  The Court cited Sylvania to justify the 
application of rule of reason analysis in the horizontal setting in both NCAA v. University of 
Oklahoma44 and Indiana Federation of Dentists.45  Amex can be understood as providing 
additional clarification on the scope of the Sylvania doctrine.  Amex indicates that Sylvania 
should not be read narrowly as a rule that applies only in vertical relationships between upstream 
and downstream parties in a supply chain. 
Among digital platforms, the combination of negative and positive prices is most obvious in the 
case of Bing.  Every search inquiry is a transaction.  For each such inquiry, the advertiser pays a 
positive price and the Bing user (if he has signed up for rewards) pays a negative price.  In the 
case of Google, the price for every search consumer is zero, while the advertiser pays a positive 
price for every search.  Amex clearly presents a hurdle for litigants who attempt to argue that 
Bing has monopoly power in the market for advertisers, since they would have to show that the 
net price has increased in a manner consistent with monopoly power. 
There are two implications of Amex here.  First, in many cases, the benefits to consumers on the 
other side of the platform will not be as significant as in Amex.46  Return to the example of 
Bing’s rewards program.  The rewards to search consumers offered by Bing are quite small on 
                                                 
42 Lindsay Konsko, Why Don’t More Retailers Accept American Express, NERDWALLET (March 8, 2019), 
https://www.nerdwallet.com/blog/credit-cards/retailers-accept-american-express/.   
43 Continental Television v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
44 NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
45 FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986). 
46 On the value of Amex points: Maximize Monday: What Do 50,000 Amex Points Get You?, THE POINTS GUY (Apr. 
22, 2013),  https://thepointsguy.com/2013/04/maximize-monday-what-do-50000-amex-points-get-you/.   
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per-transaction basis in comparison to the prices charged to advertisers.47  The fact that Bing is a 
two-sided market does not lead immediately to the implication that proof of monopoly power is 
nearly impossible after Amex because of the difficulty of calculating the net price of the platform 
service.  In most cases, the rewards to consumers on the other side of the platform are too trivial 
to substantially affect the net price calculation. 
Second, Amex can be met by a rough assessment of the magnitude of benefits, or the negative 
price on the other side of the market.  Where the benefits on the other side of the platform are 
substantial, the difficulty of showing monopoly power, under the “direct evidence” hypothetical 
monopoly approach,48 will be difficult given Amex.   
However, the direct evidence approach is only one of two common methods of inferring 
monopoly power.  The more traditional approach, the “indirect evidence” structural approach, 
involves inferring monopoly power through evidence of a large market share and the existence of 
entry barriers.   This was the approach followed in Microsoft III.  This common approach to 
inferring monopoly power is unaffected by Amex.  Moreover, in the background, one should 
keep in mind that monopoly power is difficult to define clearly in any event, and even more 
difficult to measure.  In many applications by courts, the monopoly power test serves 
functionally as a screen against intrusive antitrust in settings where efficiencies are plausible but 
unlikely to be demonstrated.49  Amex is probably one of those cases. 
The Bing example shows why focusing on one side of the market could lead one astray.  Bing 
does not have monopoly power in the search market.  However, suppose Bing catered to a subset 
of search consumers that advertisers prefer to target.  For example, Bing users are a bit older than 
Google users, and this difference may affect the prices Bing charges to advertisers.  Suppose also 
that Bing’s rewards program grew to the point where it offered substantial payoffs to search 
consumers.  In this scenario, Bing might adopt a strategy of charging high prices to advertisers 
coupled with substantial prizes to consumers.50  An antitrust claim focusing on Bing’s charges to 
advertisers might propose that the charges should be accepted as evidence of market power.  A 
court might be persuaded that Bing has market power after being presented evidence that 
advertisers remained with Bing even after significant price hikes coupled with reward expansions 
                                                 
47 On the value of Bing rewards, see Miranda Miller, The Complete Guide to Bing Rewards: What Are Bing 
Rewards & How Can You Use Them?, WORDSTREAM (Oct. 12, 2018), 
https://www.wordstream.com/blog/ws/2015/01/08/bing-rewards.  
48 By the “direct evidence” approach, I refer to the use of evidence of supracompetitive prices coupled with the 
reluctance of consumers to substitute other products in response to those prices.  This approach has become a 
powerful method of proof in the last two decades.  For an example of the direct evidence method, see FTC v. Staples 
Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066 (DDC 1997).  The trial court’s decision finding monopoly power in the merchant market in 
Amex was based largely on “direct evidence” proof submitted by plaintiffs’ expert. 
49 Keith N. Hylton, Brown Shoe and the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, Review of Industrial Organization, 39 REV. 
INDUSTRIAL ORG. 95, 97-106 (2011).  On the difficulties of measuring market power, see HYLTON, ANTITRUST LAW, 
230-243, supra note 33. 
50 One byproduct of such a strategy is that it would hasten the development of property rights in data. As Bing is 
observed offering rewards to consumers in exchange for their data, other platforms would feel competitive pressure 
to do the same. Such competitive rewards eventually would generate a system of property in data. 
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to consumers.  Such an inference would be false, because it would confuse a competitive strategy 
with evidence of monopoly power. 
As another application of Amex to digital platforms, consider Apple and its App Store.  Apple 
charges a commission of 30 percent to the app developer.  An app might have a price of $0.99 to 
the consumer, meaning that Apple takes almost $0.30 from the transaction. The App Store is a 
two-sided market, like the credit-card network.   
For simplicity, let’s treat the app price as $1.00.  The revenue to the app developer who prices at 
$1.00 is $0.70, so it as if the developer sells to the consumer at full price of $1.00, and then pays 
Apple $.30.  An alternative way to think of the transaction is that the consumer pays $.30 to 
Apple and $0.70 to the developer.  These are equivalent ways of describing the transaction. 
The revenue to the Apple platform is, theoretically, based on a price charged to both app 
developer and consumer.  The developer pays a positive price to the platform and the consumer 
pays nothing to the platform.  However, it would be equally valid to describe the transaction as 
one where the developer pays nothing and the consumer pays the commission.  Indeed, Apple 
could easily change the model to one where the consumer pays a percentage fee directly to the 
platform for each transaction.  Instead of taking 30 percent of the price set by the app developer, 
Apple could directly charge the consumer 43 percent of the price charged by the developer.  
Assuming the current price of the app is optimal from the developer’s perspective, altering the 
allocation of Apple’s charge would not affect the price of the app to the consumer. 
Although Apple’s App Store seems initially to have the features of a two-sided market, as in 
Amex, it is different.  In Amex, the charge to the merchant cannot simply be passed on to the 
Amex consumer.  In the App Store, a charge to the merchant can easily be shifted to the 
consumer with no material effect (other than relabeling).  This suggests that Amex may not be 
applicable to the App Store.  The App Store is seemingly a two-sided market, but not of the sort 
observed in Amex, because the optimal allocation of the App Store platform charge is 
indeterminate. 
Moreover, there is a similarity between the territorial restriction upheld in Sylvania on rule of 
reason grounds, and the anti-steering restriction challenged in Amex.  Because of this, I have 
suggested, Amex should be viewed as a clarification or amplification of Sylvania.  The App Store 
has restrictions too, but they are not similar in function to the restriction in Sylvania.  
Apple prohibits its app developers from selling apps developed for the App Store outside of the 
store, and prohibits consumers from purchasing apps outside of the store.  These restrictions are 
challenged in a case now before the Supreme Court, Apple v. Pepper.51  Apple’s restrictions are 
designed to protect the quality of products in the App Store, and to enable Apple to engage in 
price discrimination in the sale of iPhones.  If Apple were prevented from enforcing these 
restrictions, it would have to raise the price of the iPhone.  This would shrink the iPhone 
platform, and result in users with low demand for apps subsidizing users with high demand for 
                                                 
51 In re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litig., 846 F.3d 313 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. granted sub. nom. Apple, Inc. v. Pepper, 
138 S. Ct. 2647 (2018).  
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apps.  This suggests that the efficiencies associated with Apple’s restrictions on the App Store 
are quite different from those associated with the Amex anti-steering policy.   
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
Digital platforms raise antitrust complaints because the best known, Google and Facebook, 
appear to be monopolists in many of the markets in which they operate.  The platform 
monopolies that have appeared have resulted because of economies of scale, not from 
anticompetitive practices.  As digital markets mature, digital platforms are likely to differentiate 
and specialize to some degree, easing some of the current concerns over competition.  In the 
meantime, the business strategies of digital platforms do not present a clear justification for 
reforming the antitrust laws.  
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